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A NEXT STEP IN HEALTH CARE REFORM: ENSURING THE
PROTECTION OF EMPLOYEE RIGHTS UNDER THE FAMILY AND
MEDICAL LEAVE ACT

APRIL G. DAWSON*
ABSTRACT
On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act into law. Notwithstanding the current constitutional
challenges to the law, this historic legislation reaffirmed the basic principle
that everyone should be afforded the opportunity to have security when it
comes to health care. Such security also includes security in employment
when a serious health condition causes an employee to be out of work for a
temporary period of time. Indeed, it was the recognition of the need for job
security during a time of illness which led Congress to enact the Family and
Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) in 1993, providing eligible employees twelve
workweeks of leave each year to allow an employee to care for a spouse, child
or parent facing a serious health condition or when the employee is battling his
or her own serious health condition.
However, when the Department of Labor (“DOL”) amended FMLA
regulations in November 2008 to allow employers to secure unsupervised
waivers of employees’ FMLA rights, it severely undercut job security afforded
employees under the Act. The DOL’s amendment weakens the intended
protection of the Act by providing employers with the ability to easily avoid
responsibility for FMLA violations, which in turn facilitates the removal of
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employees who should be protected under the FMLA. This Article argues that
employees should only choose to waive their FMLA rights after being fully
and adequately informed about what their rights are and that this can only be
accomplished through supervised waivers. This Article further advocates for
executive and legislative action to revise the law, and proposes litigation
strategies for effectively challenging FMLA waivers under the current
regulatory scheme.
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INTRODUCTION
On Tuesday, March 23, 2010, President Barack Obama signed the historic
health care reform bill making the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
the law of the land.1 During the signing ceremony, the President stated that
with this new law, the government had enshrined “the core principle that
everybody should have some basic security when it comes to their health
care.”2 Security when it comes to health care also includes security in
employment when a serious health condition causes an employee to be out of
work for a temporary period of time. It was this recognition for the need for
job security which led Congress, after years of effort by advocates for federal
sick leave legislation, to enact the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
(“FMLA”).3 The FMLA provides eligible employees twelve workweeks of
leave each year to allow the employee to care for a child following the birth,
adoption, or foster care placement of the child; “to care for the spouse, or a
son, daughter, or parent, of the employee, if such spouse, son, daughter, or
parent has a serious health condition”; and to allow an employee to receive
treatment “[b]ecause of a serious health condition that makes the employee
unable to perform the functions of the [employee’s] position.”4 Employers
may not “interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to
exercise, any right provided [by the Act].”5 Nor may employers discriminate
or retaliate against an employee for exercising his or her FMLA rights.6
An issue that received recent attention was whether FMLA rights were
waivable absent court or the Department of Labor (“DOL”) approval. The
question was whether FMLA rights should be treated like Fair Labor Standards
Act (“FLSA”)7 rights and waivable only with approval by a court or the DOL,
or whether FMLA rights should be treated like Title VII8 rights and waivable
without approval by the court or the overseeing administrative agency. At the
center of this debate was the 1995 FMLA regulation 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d),
which provided in part that “[e]mployees cannot waive, nor may employers
induce employees to waive, their rights under FMLA.”9

1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010);
Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, A Stroke of a Pen, Make That 20, and it’s Official, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 24, 2010, at A19.
2. Stolberg & Pear, supra note 1.
3. Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–54 (2006)).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1).
5. Id. § 2615(a)(1).
6. Id. § 2615(a)(2).
7. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19 (2006).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
9. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d) (1995). The full text of the original 1995 provision of
825.220(d), which was effective until January 15, 2009, is as follows:
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Only two circuit courts—the Fifth Circuit and the Fourth Circuit—directly
addressed the issue and interpreted the regulation, and they reached opposite
conclusions. The Fifth Circuit held in Faris v. Williams WPC–1, Inc. that
section 825.220(d) only bars the prospective (future) waiver of substantive
rights and not the retrospective (after the fact) release of claims.10 The Fourth
Circuit held in Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc. that section 825.220(d)
prohibits both the prospective and retrospective waiver of FMLA rights and
claims unless the waiver is approved by the DOL or a court.11 The United
States Supreme Court declined to hear Taylor.12 The Supreme Court’s
decision to deny certiorari was most likely based on the Solicitor General’s
recommendation that the Court deny certiorari because the DOL had taken
steps to amend section 825.220(d).13
As the Solicitor General indicated in its brief, the DOL, on November 17,
2008, issued a final rule amending section 825.220(d) to read: “Employees
cannot waive, nor may employers induce employees to waive, their
prospective rights under FMLA.”14 The DOL further amended the regulation

(d) Employees cannot waive, nor may employers induce employees to waive, their rights
under FMLA. For example, employees (or their collective bargaining representatives)
cannot “trade off” the right to take FMLA leave against some other benefit offered by the
employer. This does not prevent an employee’s voluntary and uncoerced acceptance (not
as a condition of employment) of a “light duty” assignment while recovering from a
serious health condition (see §825.702(d)). In such a circumstance the employee’s right to
restoration to the same or an equivalent position is available until 12 weeks have passed
within the 12-month period, including all FMLA leave taken and the period of “light
duty.”
10. 332 F.3d 316, 321 (5th Cir. 2003).
11. 493 F.3d 454, 463 (4th Cir. 2007).
12. Progress Energy, Inc., v. Taylor, 128 S. Ct. 2931 (2008) (mem.).
13. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 19, Progress Energy, Inc., v. Taylor, 128
S. Ct. 2931 (2008) (No. 07-539), 2008 WL 2095733.
14. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d) (2009) (emphasis added). The full text of the amended provision
of section 825.220(d), which became January 16, 2009, is as follows:
(d) Employees cannot waive, nor may employers induce employees to waive, their
prospective rights under FMLA. For example, employees (or their collective bargaining
representatives) cannot “trade off” the right to take FMLA leave against some other
benefit offered by the employer. This does not prevent the settlement or release of FMLA
claims by employees based on past employer conduct without the approval of the
Department of Labor or a court. Nor does it prevent an employee’s voluntary and
uncoerced acceptance (not as a condition of employment) of a ‘‘light duty’’ assignment
while recovering from a serious health condition (see §825.702(d)). An employee’s
acceptance of such ‘‘light duty’’ assignment does not constitute a waiver of the
employee’s prospective rights, including the right to be restored to the same position the
employee held at the time the employee’s FMLA leave commenced or to an equivalent
position. The employee’s right to restoration, however, ceases at the end of the applicable
12-month FMLA leave year.
Id.
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to explicitly state that section 825.220(d) “does not prevent the settlement or
release of FMLA claims by employees based on past employer conduct
without the approval of the Department of Labor or a court.”15 The
amendment to section 825.220(d) became effective January 16, 2009.16
Now, approximately two years after the amendment allowing unsupervised
waivers of FMLA claims, it appears that the DOL’s rule has threatened the job
security of employees requiring leave under the FMLA. As will be discussed,
the lack of oversight of the FMLA waiver process allows employers to easily
circumvent the requirements of the FMLA and avoid responsibility for
violations of the Act. This weakening of the FMLA is even more
disconcerting given the current state of massive job losses. The increase in the
number of mass layoffs and the reaffirmation that Americans deserve security
when it comes to health care issues demand a reexamination of the effects of
the DOL’s amendment to section 825.220(d). Part I of this Article provides an
overview of the enactment of the FMLA and the promulgation and judicial
interpretation of section 825.220(d). Part II examines the rules governing the
waiver of rights under the other federal employment statutes. Part III argues
that the purpose and uniqueness of the FMLA support a requirement that
FMLA waivers be approved before being valid. Finally, Part IV argues for
executive and legislative action to revise the law and proposes litigation
strategies for effectively challenging FMLA waivers under the current
regulatory scheme.
I. FMLA
A.

Enactment and Statutory Provisions

The FMLA was signed into law by President Bill Clinton in 1993,
following years of congressional debates and two vetoes by President George
H.W. Bush.17 Congress enacted the FMLA after finding, inter alia, that “the

15. Id.
16. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Effectiveness of Information Collection
Requirements, 74 Fed. Reg. 2862, 2863 (Jan. 16, 2009).
17. Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–54 (2006); Statement on Signing the
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 1 PUB. PAPERS 50 (Feb. 5, 1993). The Family Medical
Leave Act of 1990, H.R. 770, 101st Cong. (1990), was vetoed by President George H.W. Bush on
June 29, 1990. Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval the Family
and Medical Leave Act of 1990, 1 PUB. PAPERS 890 (June 29, 1990). On July 25, 1990 the
House of Representatives failed to obtain the necessary votes to override a Presidential Veto,
obtaining only 232 of the needed 285 votes (2/3 of House of Representatives membership). 136
CONG. REC. 19,142–43 (1990). Two years later a similar bill, The Family Medical Leave Act of
1992, S.5, 102nd Cong. (1992), was vetoed by President George H.W. Bush on September 22,
1992. Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval the Family and Medical Leave Act of
1992, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1625 (Sept. 22, 1992). The Senate obtained the required votes to override
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lack of employment policies to accommodate working parents can force
individuals to choose between job security and parenting; [and that] there is
inadequate job security for employees who have serious health conditions that
prevent them from working for temporary periods.”18 Thus, the FMLA was
designed “to set a minimum labor standard for family and medical leave.”19
Under the FMLA, an “eligible” employee20 of a “covered” employer21 is
entitled to twelve weeks of leave for one or more of the following:
(A) . . . the birth of a son or daughter of the employee and in order to care for
such son or daughter[;]
(B) . . . the placement of a son or daughter with the employee for adoption or
foster care[;]
(C) [i]n order to care for the spouse, or a son, daughter, or parent, of the
employee, if such spouse, son, daughter, or parent has a serious health
condition[;]
(D) [b]ecause of a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to
22
perform the functions of the position of such employee.

the Presidential Veto (obtaining 68 votes when 66 were required). 138 CONG. REC. 27,513
(1992). However, on September 30, 1992, the House of Representatives failed to obtain the
necessary votes to override the Presidential Veto, obtaining only 258 of the needed 285 votes (2/3
of House of Representatives membership). 138 CONG. REC. 29,140 (1992).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(3)–(4) (2006).
19. Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc. (Taylor I), 415 F.3d 364, 374 (4th Cir. 2005).
20. Employees are eligible if they have worked for a covered employer for at least 12
months and worked 1250 hours during the 12-month period immediately preceding the start of
the leave. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2) (2006); 29 C.F.R. § 825.110 (2010).
21. The FMLA applies to all private employers engaged in any industry affecting commerce
with 50 or more employees who work 20 or more calendar workweeks within a 75-mile radius.
29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A); 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.104(a), 825.111. The FMLA also applies to all public
employers and all public and private schools are covered by the FMLA without regard to the
number of employees employed. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4); 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.104(a), 825.108(d).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a); 29 C.F.R. § 825.100(a). Additionally, on January 28, 2008,
President Bush signed into law H.R. 4986, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2008 (“NDAA”), Pub. L. No. 110-181, 122 Stat. 3. Among other things, the NDAA added
a fifth reason for leave that allows an employee to twelve (12) weeks of leave for
any qualifying exigency (as the Secretary [of Labor] shall, by regulation, determine)
arising out of the fact that the spouse, or a son, daughter, or parent of the employee is on
active duty (or has been notified of an impending call or order to active duty) in the
Armed Forces in support of a contingency operation.
Id. § 585(a)(2)(A), 122 Stat. at 129 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(E)).
The NDAA also amended the FMLA to permit a “spouse, son, daughter, parent, or next
of kin” to take up to 26 workweeks of leave to care for a “member of the Armed Forces,
including a member of the National Guard or Reserves, who is undergoing medical treatment,
recuperation, or therapy, is otherwise in outpatient status, or is otherwise on the temporary
disability retired list, for a serious injury or illness.” Id. § 585(a)(1), 122 Stat. at 128 (codified at
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The FMLA provides three categories of rights—substantive, proscriptive,
and remedial.23 The substantive rights include an employee’s right to receive
up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave for a qualifying situation24 and the right to
reinstatement following the leave.25 Other substantive rights include the
continuation of employment benefits,26 the maintenance of the employee’s
group health coverage,27 and the availability of intermittent leave.28
Additionally, “employers cannot use the taking of FMLA leave as a negative
factor in employment actions, such as hiring, promotions or disciplinary
actions; nor can FMLA leave be counted under ‘no fault’ attendance
policies.”29 Congress made it unlawful for an employer to “interfere with,
restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided
[by the Act].”30
The proscriptive rights include an employee’s right not to be discriminated
against or retaliated against for exercising FMLA rights.31 The FMLA also
provides employees with remedial rights, which provide employees with a
private right of action to recover both equitable relief and money damages
against an employer who interferes with an employee’s exercise of any rights
under the Act, or discriminates or retaliates against an employee’s exercise of
any rights under the Act.32
B.

Promulgation of Section 825.220(d)

Congress delegated authority to the Secretary of Labor to prescribe the
regulations necessary to administer the FMLA.33 As required under the notice-

29 U.S.C. § 2611(15)); id. § 585(a)(2)(B), 122 Stat. at 129 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(3)).
This provision became effective January 28, 2008.
23. Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc. (Taylor II), 493 F.3d 454, 457 (4th Cir. 2007).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2006).
25. Id. § 2614(a)(1).
26. Id. § 2614(a)(2).
27. Id. § 2614(c)(1).
28. Id. § 2612(b)(1).
29. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) (2010).
30. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1); see also Babcock v. BellSouth Adver. & Publ’g Corp., 348 F.3d
73, 76 (4th Cir. 2003) (noting that an employee may recover damages or equitable relief when
such interference, restraint, or denial of FMLA rights occurs).
31. Taylor II, 493 F.3d 454, 457 (4th Cir. 2007); see 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2); see also
Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1325 (10th Cir. 1997) (discussing the elements necessary to
assert a violation of § 2615(a) due to retaliation).
32. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2615(a)(1)–(2), 2617(a)(1)–(2); Taylor II, 493 F.3d at 457; see also Nev.
Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 724–25 (2003) (noting the FMLA’s creation of “a
private right of action to seek both equitable relief and money damages”).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 2654. The Secretary designated the Wage and Hour Division of the
Department of Labor’s Employment Standards Administration as the agency responsible for
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and-comment section of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”),34 the
Secretary published a request for comments on issues to be addressed in
drafting the regulations for the FMLA.35 On June 4, 1993, the Secretary
published interim regulations for the FMLA, along with comments as to how
the regulations had been formulated.36 In addition to publishing the interim
regulations, the Secretary made a request for additional comments before the
final regulations were scheduled to take effect.37
One of the interim regulations was section 825.220(d), which provided in
part that “[e]mployees cannot waive their rights under FMLA . . . . [and]
[e]mployers are prohibited from inducing an employee to waive rights under
the Act.”38 Some employers expressed concerns with section 825.220(d) and
“recommended explicit allowance of waivers and releases in connection with
settlement of FMLA claims and as part of a severance package (as allowed
under Title VII and ADEA claims, for example).”39 Rejecting the employers’
recommendation, the DOL stated that it
ha[d] given careful consideration to the comments received on this section and
ha[d] concluded that prohibitions against employees waiving their rights and
employers inducing employees to waive their rights constitute sound public
policy under the FMLA, as is also the case under other labor standards statutes
40
such as the FLSA.

The final regulations varied little from the interim regulations,41 and the final
version of section 825.220(d) was identical to the interim version.42
C. Judicial Interpretation of Section 825.220(d)
The first reported case applying and thus interpreting section 825.220(d)
was Bluitt v. Eval Co. of America.43 Bluitt involved an employee who was
terminated by her employer after she failed to report to work because of

administering and enforcing the FMLA. Implementation of the Family and Medical Leave Act of
1993, 58 Fed. Reg. 13,394 (Mar. 10, 1993).
34. 5 U.S.C § 553(b) (2006) (stating that “[g]eneral notice of proposed rule making shall be
published in the Federal Register, unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally
served or otherwise have actual notice thereof in accordance with law”).
35. Implementation of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 58 Fed. Reg. at 13,394.
36. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 58 Fed. Reg. 31,794 (June 4, 1993).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 31,825–26.
39. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 60 Fed. Reg. 2180, 2218 (Jan. 6, 1995).
40. Id.
41. Compare, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 825.113(c)(2) (1993), with 60 Fed. Reg. at 2244, and 58 Fed.
Reg. at 31,817.
42. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d) (1993), with 58 Fed. Reg. at 31,825.
43. 3 F. Supp. 2d 761 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
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alleged serious health problems.44 The employee subsequently filed an FMLA
action against her employer asserting that her employer violated the FMLA
because she was not advised of her rights under the FMLA prior to her
termination.45 The employee had signed a “Settlement Agreement and General
Release” related to an entirely separate action approximately two weeks after
her termination.46 When the employee filed the FMLA action, the employer
argued that the employee had waived her rights when she signed the settlement
agreement and general release.47 The court concluded, however, that section
825.220(d) precluded waiver of the employee’s FMLA claim.48
Four years later, the second published opinion addressing section
825.220(d) was issued in the case of Dierlam v. Wesley Jessen Corp.49
Dierlam involved an employee who filed an FMLA action against her former
employer because the employer reduced her bonus based on the employee’s
twelve-week leave for adoption of a child.50 Prior to filing the lawsuit, the
employee completed her term with the employer and upon leaving the
company the employee signed a Separation Agreement and General Release.51
Like the court in Bluitt, the Dierlam court concluded that section 825.220(d)
precluded waiver of the employee’s claim despite the all inclusive language of
the general release.52
Although there was little judicial attention initially given to section
825.220(d) following its promulgation, beginning in 2003, a year after the
Dierlam decision, a number of courts addressed the meaning of section
825.220(d) and often reached different results.
1.

Faris v. Williams WPC-I, Inc.

The first court to closely analyze section 825.220(d) was the Fifth Circuit
in the case of Faris v. Williams WPC-I, Inc.53 Faris involved an employee
who maintained that she was terminated in retaliation for asserting her FMLA
rights.54 Prior to filing her lawsuit, Faris had signed a release, which did not
specifically mention the FMLA, but provided that Faris was waiving her rights
to “all other claims arising under any other federal, state or local law or

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 762.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Bluitt, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 764.
222 F. Supp. 2d 1052 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
Id. at 1054.
Id.
Id. at 1056.
332 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 318.
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regulation.”55 Thus, the only issue to be resolved by the Fifth Circuit was
whether section 825.220(d) prohibits the waiver of an employee’s right to
bring a retaliation claim pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2).56
The Fifth Circuit began its analysis by discussing whether the term
“employee” in section 825.220(d) referred to only current employees.57 While
the Fifth Circuit concluded that there were strong indications that the term
“employee” refers only to current employees, it declined to reach that issue.58
The Fifth Circuit next addressed the employer’s argument “that the
regulation extends only to ‘substantive rights’ under the FMLA, rather than to
post-dispute causes of action for retaliation.”59 The court began its analysis by
distinguishing between the substantive rights and the right to be free from
retaliation.60 The court then concluded that the term “rights under the law” in
the regulation was in reference to only the substantive rights.61 The court
specifically noted that “[t]he cause of action for discrimination, however, is
never described as an FMLA right itself, within the regulation or elsewhere.”62
The court, having distinguished FMLA substantive rights and FMLA
proscriptive rights (which include the right to be free from retaliation),
concluded that the phrase “rights under FMLA” as used in section 825.220(d)
was in reference to the substantive FMLA rights only and did not incorporate
proscriptive or retaliation rights.63 Based on this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit
held the regulation did not prohibit Faris from waiving her proscriptive rights,
and thus concluded that the release signed by Faris barred her from bringing
her retaliation claim.64
The court, however, did not end its analysis with the distinction between
the prescriptive (substantive) and proscriptive (retaliation) rights under the
FMLA. After making the substantive-retaliation distinction and stating that
“[s]everal factors support the interpretation that this regulation applies only to
waiver of substantive rights under the statute, such as rights to leave,
reinstatement, etc., rather than to a cause of action for retaliation for the
exercise of those rights,”65 the court concluded without clear explanation or
analysis that section 825.220(d) prohibits only the prospective waiver of

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
See id. at 320–21.
Id. at 320.
Faris, 332 F.3d at 320.
Id.
Id. at 320–21.
Id.
Id. at 321 (emphasis added).
Faris, 332 F.3d at 322.
Id.
Id. at 320 (emphasis added).
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substantive rights.66 However, that language is arguably mere dictum because
that issue was not before the court or the basis for the court’s conclusion that
the regulation did not prevent Faris from waiving her rights to bring a
retaliation claim.
As will be discussed in greater detail below, notwithstanding the fact that
the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that section 825.220(d) prohibits only the
prospective waiver of substantive rights is dicta, the DOL nevertheless adopted
the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that section 825.220(d) only prohibits the
prospective waiver of rights.67
2.

Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc. (Taylor I)

Two years after the Fifth Circuit issued the Faris decision, the Fourth
Circuit in 2005 interpreted section 825.220(d) in Taylor v. Progress Energy,
Inc. (“Taylor I”).68 Taylor involved an employee who claimed that she was
misinformed of her FMLA rights, improperly denied FMLA-qualifying leave,
had her FMLA-qualifying leave counted against her in raise determinations,
had her FMLA-qualifying leave counted against her in her performance
evaluation, and was selected for termination in a reduction in force as a result
of her improper performance evaluation and in retaliation for attempting to
exercise her FMLA rights.69 Taylor was required to sign a severance
agreement and a general release to receive her severance benefits.70 The
release did not specifically mention the FMLA, but included language which
stated that the employee was waiving “claims . . . arising under . . . any other
federal, state or local law.”71 Taylor thereafter filed suit alleging a number of
FMLA violations.72 In response to the employer’s argument that Taylor
waived her rights when she signed the general release, Taylor argued that 29
C.F.R. § 825.220(d) prohibits the waiver of Taylor’s FMLA rights through the
signing of the general release.73 The trial court disagreed, adopted the
reasoning of the Fifth Circuit decision in Faris,74 and held that section
825.220(d) only bars the prospective (future) waiver of substantive rights and

66. Id. at 321.
67. However, the DOL later disagreed with the Fifth Circuit that the phrase “rights under
FMLA” as used in 825.220(d) is limited to only substantive rights. See Taylor II, 493 F.3d 454,
458 (4th Cir. 2007).
68. 415 F.3d 364, 365 (4th Cir. 2005).
69. Id. at 366–68.
70. Id. at 367.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 367–68.
73. Taylor I, 415 F.3d at 368.
74. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2011]

A NEXT STEP IN HEALTH CARE REFORM

13

not the retrospective (after the fact) release of claims.75 On appeal, a
unanimous panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the release signed
by Taylor was not enforceable with regard to her FMLA claims because, based
on the plain language of the regulation, section 825.220(d) prohibits both the
prospective and retrospective waiver of FMLA rights and claims, unless the
waiver is approved by the DOL or a court.76
The Fourth Circuit later granted the employer’s petition for rehearing and
allowed the DOL to file an amicus brief and present oral arguments in support
of the employer’s position that section 825.220(d) only prohibits prospective,
but not retrospective, waiver of rights. The court then went on to issue the
Taylor II decision.77
3.

Taylor v. Progress Energy (Taylor II)

Following rehearing, a now divided panel of the Fourth Circuit again held
that section 825.220(d) prohibits the waiver of all of FMLA rights (substantive,
proscriptive, and remedial) and is not limited to only prospective waivers of
these rights.78 Looking to the plain language of the regulation, the Court of
Appeals concluded that the phrase “rights under FMLA” includes no
limitations regarding the specific rights under the FMLA and includes no

75. Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., No. 7:03-CV-73-H(1), 2004 WL 5576902, at *5
(E.D.N.C. Mar. 22, 2004).
76. Taylor I, 415 F.3d at 375.
77. In between Taylor I and Taylor II, two district courts addressed the issue of the meaning
of 825.220(d). In July 2006, the United States District Court for Oregon in Brizzee v. Fred Meyer
Stores, Inc. followed the Fourth Circuit and held that an employee may not waive their rights
under the FMLA without approval from a court or the DOL. No. CV04-1566-ST, 2006 WL
2045857, at *11 (D. Or. July 17, 2006). The court stated that it was “more persuaded by the
thorough analysis and reasoning of the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Taylor.” Id. The court
reaffirmed its position in 2008. Brizzee v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., No. CV 04-1566-ST, 2008
WL 426510, at *3 (D. Or. Feb. 13, 2008) (“This court has carefully reviewed the arguments for
the opposing positions and remains persuaded by the Fourth Circuit’s analysis.”).
Then in August of that same year, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania in Dougherty v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA (Dougherty I) addressed the
issue. No. 05-2336, 2006 WL 2529632 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2006). The court initially agreed with
the Fourth Circuit in Taylor I and held that section 825.220(d) prohibited employees from
waiving their FMLA rights. Id. at *6. However, the court granted the employer’s motion for
reconsideration and in a decision dated April 9, 2007 (after the Fourth Circuit granted rehearing
in Taylor, but before the Fourth Circuit decided and issued its opinion in Taylor II) the Dougherty
court vacated its earlier order and held “[s]ection 825.220(d) does not prohibit an employee from
waiving past FMLA claims as part of a severance agreement or settlement.” Dougherty v. Teva
Pharm. USA (Dougherty II), No. 05-2336, 2007 WL 1165068, at *6–7 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2007).
On February 20, 2008, following the Fourth Circuit’s Taylor II decision, discussed in detail
below, the court reaffirmed its holding in Dougherty II. Dougherty v. Teva Pharm. USA
(Dougherty III), No. 05-CV-2336, 2008 WL 508011, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 2008).
78. Taylor II, 493 F.3d 454, 463 (4th Cir. 2007).
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limitations regarding prospective or retrospective waivers.79 The court further
noted that there is nothing in the plain language that limits the waiver
prohibition to only prospective waivers.80 The court also noted that there is
nothing in the plain language that would suggest that the phrase “rights under
FMLA” does not include remedial rights—the right of action provided under
section 2617(a)(2).81
The court also concluded that the DOL’s proffered interpretation was
inconsistent with the regulation and should therefore be rejected.82 The court
also concluded that the DOL’s current interpretation was inconsistent with the
Department’s position at the time the regulation was promulgated in 1995.83
The court noted that the DOL specifically considered and rejected a proposed
amendment that would have excluded severance agreement waivers (generally
retrospective waivers) from the waiver prohibition in section 220(d).84
Rejecting the request to change the provision, the DOL explained that it had
carefully considered the comments on section 220(d) and “concluded that
prohibitions against employees waiving their rights and employers inducing
employees to waive their rights constitute sound public policy under the
FMLA, as is also the case under other labor standards statutes such as the
FLSA.”85
The panel reinstated its opinion in Taylor I, and reaffirmed its conclusion
that “without prior DOL or court approval, 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d) bars the
prospective and retrospective waiver or release of rights under the FMLA,
including the right to bring an action or claim for a violation of the Act.”86 The
dissenting judge disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the language of
section 825.220(d) was clear and unambiguous and argued that, under Auer v.
Robbins,87 deference should be given to the DOL’s interpretation of its own

79. Id. at 456–57.
80. Id. at 458. Despite the DOL’s claim that section 220(d) only prohibits the prospective
waiver of substantive rights, the regulation’s plain language controls when a regulation is clear
and unambiguous. Id.; see Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000) (“To defer to
the agency’s position would be to permit the agency, under the guise of interpreting a regulation,
to create de facto a new regulation.”).
81. Taylor II, 493 F.3d at 457.
82. Id. at 461.
83. Id. at 461–62.
84. Id. at 461; see Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 60 Fed. Reg. 2180, 2218 (Jan. 6,
1995).
85. 60 Fed. Reg. at 2218.
86. Taylor II, 493 F.3d at 463.
87. 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
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regulation.88 The United States Supreme Court denied the Petition for
Certiorari filed on behalf of the employer in Taylor.89
D. Amendment of Section 825.220(d)
Prior to the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of section 825.220(d), the DOL
was silent regarding the meaning of that regulatory provision. However,
following the Fourth Circuit’s July 2005 decision in Taylor I, the DOL issued a
Request for Information (“RFI”) on December 1, 2006, requesting information
regarding, inter alia, employees’ waiver of FMLA rights pursuant to section
825.220(d).90 This was the first indication that the DOL was reviewing and
considering taking formal steps to amend the regulation. After the Fourth
Circuit decided Taylor II in July 2007, wherein it reiterated its holding in
Taylor I that section 825.220(d) required supervised waivers of FMLA claims,
the DOL issued a notice of proposed rulemaking which included a proposed
amendment to section 825.220(d).91 Following the Court’s denial of certiorari,
the DOL issued a final rule on November 17, 2008, amending section
825.220(d).92 With the amendment, which became effective January 16, 2009,
the DOL modified the regulation to explicitly state that section 825.220(d)
“does not prevent the settlement or release of FMLA claims by employees

88. Taylor II, 493 F.3d at 464 (Duncan, J., dissenting).
89. Progress Energy, Inc. v. Taylor, 128 S. Ct. 2931 (2008) (mem.). At the request of the
Court, the United States Solicitor General filed an invitation brief addressing the issue of review.
Although the Solicitor General argued that the Fourth Circuit erred in rejecting the Department of
Labor’s interpretation of section 825.220(d), he nevertheless recommended that the Court deny
certiorari because the DOL had proposed a new regulation that would clarify the issue of
employees waiving their FMLA rights. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 19,
Progress Energy, Inc. v. Taylor, 128 S. Ct. 2931 (2008), 493 F.3d 316 (2007) (No. 07-539), 2008
WL 2095733.
90. Request for Information on the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 71 Fed. Reg.
69,504, 69,509–10 (Dec. 1, 2006).
91. The DOL stated:
The Department proposes to clarify the language in paragraph (d) in light of the Fourth
Circuit’s decision in Taylor which held that employees cannot voluntarily settle their past
FMLA claims. The Department disagrees with that reading of the regulations. As the
example in the current regulations reveals, this provision was intended to apply only to
the waiver of prospective rights. In the interest of clarity, however, the Department
proposes to make explicit in paragraph (d) that employees and employers should be
permitted to voluntarily agree to the settlement of past claims without having to first
obtain the permission or approval of the Department or a court. The Department does not
believe this is a change in the law as it has never been the Department’s practice, since the
enactment of the FMLA, to supervise such voluntary settlements.
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. 7876, 7901 (Feb. 11, 2008).
92. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,934 (Nov. 17, 2008).
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based on past employer conduct without the approval of the Department of
Labor or a court.”93
When the DOL issued the final rule amending section 825.220(d), the
agency maintained that its amendment did not change the regulation, but
merely clarified the meaning of the provision.94 Indeed, the DOL has
maintained since filing its amicus curiae brief in Taylor II (the first time the
DOL commented on the waiver provision of section 825.220(d)) that the
phrase “waiver of rights” in section 825.220(d) refers to only prospective
waiver of rights.
Despite the DOL’s claim that it has always viewed the language in section
825.220(d)—”an employee may not waive his rights”—as only applying to
prospective waivers,95 it bears noting that in previous litigation the DOL
clearly viewed the phrase “waiver of rights” as relating to the waiver of
retrospective claims. In Niland v. Delta Recycling Corp.96 the DOL filed an
amicus curiae brief in support of the employer, wherein the Secretary uses the
phrase “waiver of [Appellant’s] rights” to refer to the settlement of claims
arising from past violations of employment laws.97 Niland was a case wherein
93. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d) (2009).
94. The DOL stated:
Because of the perceived ambiguity in the 1995 regulation, the Department now clarifies
that it intends, as it has always intended, for the waiver prohibition to apply only to
prospective FMLA rights. The Department notes that it intended under the proposal to
allow employees to enter severance agreements releasing FMLA claims based on past
employer conduct, in addition to allowing settlement of FMLA claims in situations where
the employee has filed a claim against the employer. The Department has never
interpreted the waiver provision as applying to the settlement of claims or to the release of
FMLA claims in severance agreements based on past employer conduct, whether known
or unknown to the employee at the time of entering the severance agreement. In the
interest of further clarity, the Department has modified the language in the final rule. By
changing the language from settling past FMLA claims to settling or releasing FMLA
claims based on past conduct by the employer, the Department intends to make clear that
an employee may waive his or her FMLA claims based on past conduct by the employer,
whether such claims are filed or not filed, or known or unknown to the employee as of the
date of signing the settlement or the severance agreement. Thus, an employee may sign a
severance agreement with his or her employer releasing the employer from all FMLA
claims based on past conduct by the employer. An employee may also settle an FMLA
claim against his or her employer without Department or court approval. The Department
believes this promotes the efficient resolution of FMLA claims and recognizes the
common practice of including a release of a broad array of employment claims in
severance agreements.
73 Fed. Reg. at 67,987–88.
95. Id.
96. 377 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2004).
97. Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in support of Defendant-Appellee
Delta Recycling Corp. Supporting Affirmance of the District Court at 22, Niland, 377 F.3d 1244
(No. 03-14553), 2004 WL 2445519 [hereinafter Secretary of Labor Niland Brief].
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the employer, Delta Recycling Corp., discovered that it did not pay current and
former employees overtime in accordance with the FLSA.98 The DOL and
Delta entered into a Compliance Partnership Agreement to resolve the issue.99
In part, the Compliance Partnership Agreement required Delta to conduct a
self-audit to determine overtime wage liability.100 In addition, the agreement
required the DOL to supervise the payment of any back wages and allowed
Delta to use waiver language set forth in DOL Form WH–58 (“Receipt of
Payment of Wages”).101 Delta sent a check for back wages to the plaintiff with
a letter indicating that the acceptance of the check constituted a waiver of legal
claims.102 The plaintiff eventually cashed the check and later sued Delta in the
District Court for the Southern District of Florida seeking back overtime wages
under the FLSA.103 Delta moved for summary judgment, which was
granted.104 The plaintiff appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
In its amicus curiae brief arguing for affirmance of the district court’s grant
of summary judgment, the Secretary of Labor argued that the employee
“waived his right to bring a private action” under the FLSA for the employer’s
past violation of the FLSA because the DOL supervised the payment of unpaid
wages and the employee signed a DOL-approved receipt form specifically
advising the employee that acceptance of such payment would constitute a
waiver of his rights under the FLSA.105 The Secretary’s entire discussion of
the phrase “waiver of rights” centered on the alleged retrospective waiver and
settlement of FLSA rights and claims, and the employee’s waiver of his right
to bring a private action.106 The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the DOL and
affirmed the grant of summary judgment.107 Thus, it is difficult to reconcile
the DOL’s current interpretation of the phrase “waiver of rights” with its view
of the phrase in Niland. Moreover, the DOL’s view in Niland that the phrase
“waiver of rights” speaks to past violation of claims is consistent with
Congress’ use of the phrase108 and the Supreme Court’s use of the phrase.109
98. Niland, 377 F.3d at 1245–46.
99. Id. at 1246.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Niland, 377 F.3d at 1246.
104. Id. at 1247.
105. Secretary of Labor Niland Brief, supra note 97, at 13, 16–17.
106. Id. at 13.
107. Niland, 377 F.3d at 1248.
108. Congress uses the phrase “waiver of rights” in the context of retrospective waiver of
FLSA rights or claims. In section 216(c), Congress authorizes the DOL to
supervise the payment of the unpaid minimum wages or the unpaid overtime
compensation owing to any employee or employees . . . , and the agreement of any
employee to accept such payment shall upon payment in full constitute a waiver by such
employee of any right he may have under subsection (b) of this section to such unpaid
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Finally, the DOL’s claim that the regulation only related to prospective
waiver of claims would render the regulation superfluous and thus unnecessary
because the Supreme Court acknowledged in 1974, almost twenty years before
the enactment of the FMLA, that “there can be no prospective waiver of an
employee’s rights under Title VII.”110 Thus, contrary to its assertion, the DOL
did more than simply clarify the regulation, but in fact significantly changed
the meaning of section 825.220(d). However, notwithstanding the arguments
regarding the substance of the DOL’s amendment, the end result is, be it
through clarification or outright modification of section 825.220(d), that
employers may secure unapproved waivers of FMLA rights from their
employees.
Proponents of unsupervised FMLA waivers argue that the amendment
ensures that FMLA rights are being treated like the majority of the other
federally created employment rights, which may be waived without approval

minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation and an additional equal amount as
liquidated damages.
29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (2006) (emphasis added). When Congress added the waiver provision found
in section 216(c) in 1949, it did so to encourage employers who had already violated employees’
rights under the FLSA to voluntary settle employees’ claims under the supervision of the DOL.
See Sneed v. Sneed’s Shipbuilding, Inc., 545 F.2d 537, 539 (5th Cir. 1977). Thus, when
Congress states in section 216(c) that acceptance of the settlement by an employee constitutes “a
waiver . . . of any right . . . under [the FLSA],” Congress is referring to the retrospective waiver
of rights or settlement of claims.
109. The United States Supreme Court’s rationale in Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O’Neil, 324
U.S. 697 (1945)—the case in which this Court created a judicial prohibition against waivers of an
employee’s rights under the FLSA—also supports the conclusion that the phrase “waiver of
rights” as used in the FMLA regulation includes retrospective waivers. The specific issue
addressed by the Court with respect to two of the consolidated cases was “whether an employee
subject to the terms of the [FLSA] can waive or release his right to receive from his employer
liquidated damages under Section 16(b).” Id. at 699. After stating the general proposition that “a
statutory right conferred on a private party, but affecting the public interest, may not be waived or
released if such waiver or release contravenes the statutory policy,” id. at 704, the Court
concluded that the “attempted release and waiver of rights under the Act [through the signing of
the release] was absolutely void,” id. at 714. The Court recognized that by having the employees
execute a release, the employer was attempting to effectuate a retrospective waiver of the
employee’s rights under the FLSA. See id. at 707–08.
110. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974). Interpreting the regulation in
the manner suggested by the DOL would go against the classic canon of statutory construction
that courts must avoid any interpretation that would render a regulation superfluous. See, e.g.,
TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (“It is ‘a cardinal principle of statutory
construction’ that ‘a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented,
no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’” (quoting Duncan v.
Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001))); Discover Bank v. Vaden, 396 F.3d 366, 369 (4th Cir. 2005)
(“It is a classic canon of statutory construction that courts must ‘give effect to every provision and
word in a statute and avoid any interpretation that may render statutory terms meaningless or
superfluous.’” (quoting United States v. Ryan-Webster, 353 F.3d 353, 366 (4th Cir. 2003))).
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from the overseeing agency or the courts.111 However, as demonstrated below,
there are significant differences between the FMLA and the other federal
employment statutes and rights that warrant approval of FMLA waivers before
they are valid.
II. WAIVER OF STATUTORY EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS
Currently, there are three different degrees of review of waivers of federal
employment rights. A close examination of the oversight mandated before
waivers are valid reveals that employees whose FMLA rights have been
violated are afforded the least amount of protection when an employer seeks to
have employees waive their rights.
A.

Waiver of Fair Labor Standard Act Rights

The most restrictive waiver rules apply when employees are waiving their
rights under the FLSA. The FLSA was enacted in 1938 for the purpose of
protecting workers from “substandard wages and oppressive working
hours.”112 In addition to mandating a minimum wage for covered employees,
the FLSA requires that covered employees be paid overtime wages for each
hour worked in excess of forty hours per workweek.113 Congress, recognizing
the unequal bargaining power between employers and employees, made the
FLSA’s provisions mandatory.114 However, when Congress enacted the
FLSA, it did not address whether employees’ rights under the statute could be
waived. This question was addressed by the United States Supreme Court in
Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O’Neil seven years after enactment of the statute.115
Brooklyn involved the claims of workers who were not paid their wages in
a timely manner as required by the FLSA.116 The specific issue addressed by
the Court with respect to two of the consolidated cases was “whether an
employee subject to the terms of the [FLSA] can waive or release his right to
receive from his employer liquidated damages under § 16 (b).”117 In one case,
the employee signed “a release of all of his rights under the [FLSA].”118 In the

111. See, e.g., Jessica Snorgrass, Comment, Waiving the Effectiveness of the FMLA: The AntiWaiver Approach to Enforceability of FMLA Severance Agreement Waivers, 45 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 163, 179 (2008).
112. Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 739 (1981); see also Tenn.
Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597 (1944) (The FLSA was
enacted to protect “the rights of those who toil, of those who sacrifice a full measure of their
freedom and talents to the use and profit of others.”).
113. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a)(1), 207(a)(1) (2006).
114. Brooklyn Sav. Bank, 324 U.S. at 707.
115. Id. at 699.
116. Id. at 700–02.
117. Id. at 699.
118. Id. at 700.
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second consolidated case involving the waiver issue, the employee signed a
“general release of all claims.”119
In addressing the issue of the waivability of FLSA rights, the Court
concluded that based on the policy considerations, an individual employee’s
statutory entitlements under the FLSA, i.e., right to a minimum wage and to
overtime pay, are not subject to negotiation or bargaining between employers
and employees.120 After stating the general proposition that “a statutory right
conferred on a private party, but affecting the public interest, may not be
waived or released if such waiver or release contravenes the statutory
policy,”121 the Court concluded that the “attempted release and waiver of rights
under the Act [through the signing of the release] was absolutely void.”122 The
Court reaffirmed this holding a year later in D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi.123
Thus, while Congress did not explicitly state that employees’ rights afforded
under the FLSA may not be waived, the Supreme Court concluded that
statutory entitlements under the FLSA cannot be abridged by contract or
otherwise waived because it would “nullify the purposes of the statute and
thwart the legislative policies it was designed to effectuate.”124
B.

Waiver of Title VII Rights

Employers also seek to have employees waive their rights provided under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII was enacted twenty-six
years after the enactment of the FLSA.125 In contrast to the FLSA, which set
forth minimum labor standards, Title VII addressed invidious discrimination in
employment practices based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.126
However, like the FLSA, the original statutory and regulatory language did not
address the waivability of Title VII rights. The issue of the waivability of
rights under Title VII arose ten years after its enactment in the case of
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.127
Gardner-Denver addressed the issue of whether an employee was
precluded from bringing a Title VII action when his claims were adjudicated in
binding arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement.128 The Court

119. Brooklyn Sav. Bank, 324 U.S. at 701–02.
120. Id. at 706–07.
121. Id. at 704.
122. Id. at 713–14.
123. D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 114–15 (1946) (noting that employees
generally may not waive their right to wages or liquidated damages).
124. Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740 (1981) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
126. Id.
127. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
128. Id. at 43.
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concluded that the submission, adjudication, and resolution of a claim of
discrimination under the procedures provided for under the collective
bargaining agreement did not amount to the employee waiving his rights to
pursue his claims under Title VII in a court of law.129 Although the case did
not involve a situation in which the employee signed a waiver or general
release, the Court noted that “presumably an employee may waive his cause of
action under Title VII as part of a voluntary settlement”130 provided “the
employee’s consent to the settlement was voluntary and knowing.”131 The
Court did not specifically address whether such a waiver required supervision
by the courts or the associated administrative agency. However, that the Court
only noted one requirement, i.e., that the waiver be “voluntary and knowing,”
suggests that the Court did not view waivers of Title VII claims in the same
manner as waivers of rights under the FLSA, which required court or DOL
approval. Indeed, Gardner-Denver is frequently cited for the proposition that
waiver of Title VII claims need not be supervised.132
The distinction between the agencies charged with enforcing the FLSA and
Title VII may also explain the difference in treatment of waivers. As noted
above, the DOL is tasked with the enforcement of the FLSA.133 The DOL has
the authority to adjudicate claims and impose administrative sanctions against

129. Id. at 52.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 52 n.15.
132. In promulgating the rule allowing for unsupervised waivers of ADEA claims, the EEOC
stated the following:
[T]he Commission has taken into consideration the fact that courts have consistently
recognized that Congress has expressed a strong preference for voluntary settlements of
employment discrimination claims and that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. 2000e et seq., permits employers and employees to settle disputes by using waiver
agreements as long as the waiver of rights and release of potential liability is “knowing
and voluntary.” Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 79, 88 n.14 (1981). There is
a similar preference for voluntary resolution of disputes under the ADEA. See 29 U.S.C.
626(d) (efforts at conciliation, conference, and persuasion to be made before resort to
litigation). The Supreme Court has noted that Title VII and the ADEA share a common
purpose and that similar provisions should be similarly interpreted. Oscar Mayer & Co.
v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979).
This conclusion is supported by section 2(b) of the ADEA which firmly establishes
the goal of encouraging “employers and workers [to] find ways of meeting problems
arising from the impact of age on employment.” 29 U.S.C. 621(b). Moreover, the
framers of the Act were concerned that delay would prejudice the claims of older workers
and one of their central goals was to insure expeditious resolution of disputes. See 113
Cong. Rec. 7076 (Remarks of Sen. Javits) Burns v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 696
F.2d 21, 24 n.2 (2d Cir. 1982).
Legislative Regulation and Administrative Exemption Allowing for Non-EEOC Supervised
Waivers Under the ADEA, 52 Fed. Reg. 32,293, 32,294 (Aug. 27, 1987).
133. 29 U.S.C. § 204 (2006).
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employers it has determined violated the FLSA.134 Title VII, on the other
hand, is enforced by the EEOC.135 The EEOC was created by the Civil Rights
Act of 1964136 and was given the authority to basically investigate and
conciliate charges of discrimination made by employees.137 It was not until
1972 when Congress amended Title VII that the EEOC was provided with
additional authority to institute civil actions against employers the Commission
concluded had violated Title VII.138 However, Congress did not provide the
EEOC with direct powers to adjudicate claims or impose administrative
sanctions similar to the authority provided to the DOL.139 Thus, it would have
been difficult at the time the Court decided Gardner-Denver to also provide for
only supervised waivers when the EEOC did not have the same authority over
employers as the DOL had when reviewing FLSA violations.
C. Waiver of ADEA Rights
Employees are also often asked to waive their rights under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). The ADEA was enacted in
1967 to address age discrimination of individuals forty years old or older, in
the terms and conditions of their employment, including hiring, job retention,
and compensation.140 Like the other federal employment statutes, Congress
did not initially address the waivability of ADEA claims. However, some
courts and commentators argued that because the ADEA incorporated portions
of the FLSA,141 waiver of ADEA claims required approval from the
enforcement agency (in the case of the ADEA, that would be the EEOC142) or

134. Id. § 216.
135. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006).
136. Id. § 2000e-4(a).
137. Anne Noel Occhialino & Daniel Vail, Why the EEOC (Still) Matters, 22 HOFSTRA LAB.
& EMP. L.J. 671, 672–73 (2005).
138. Id. at 677.
139. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974) (“[F]inal responsibility for
enforcement of Title VII is vested with federal courts. The Act authorizes courts to issue
injunctive relief and to order such affirmative action as may be appropriate to remedy the effects
of unlawful employment practices.”); see Occhialino & Vail, supra note 137, at 677.
140. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2006).
141. Section 626(b) provides that “[t]he provisions of [the ADEA] shall be enforced in
accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures provided in [the FLSA].” Id. § 626(b).
142. Michael J. Yaworsky, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Effect of Document or
Agreement Alleged to Constitute Private, Individual Release of Claim Under Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967 (29 USCS §§ 621–634), 88 A.L.R. FED. 412, § 2 (1988)
(“Enforcement was originally the responsibility of the Secretary of Labor, but in 1978 was
transferred to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).”).
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the court, the same as the waiver requirement for FLSA claims.143 Others
disagreed,144 and in 1986, an en banc panel of the Sixth Circuit decided
Runyan v. National Cash Register Corp., and held that waivers of ADEA
claims, like waivers of Title VII claims, did not require court or agency
Several circuits followed146 and the EEOC
approval to be valid.145
promulgated a regulation authorizing unsupervised waivers of ADEA
claims.147
Following the Runyan decision and issuance of the EEOC regulation,
Congress, concerned about unrestricted waivers of ADEA claims,148 amended
the ADEA by adding a subsection relating specifically to the wavier of ADEA
claims.149 Congress required the following: (1) the waiver must be written in
language that an average employee would understand;150 (2) the waiver must
include a specific reference to waiver of claims arising under the ADEA;151 (3)
the waiver cannot include claims that arise after the date the waiver is
signed;152 (4) the employer must provide consideration in addition to any
normal retirement benefit package;153 (5) the employer must advise the
employee in writing to consult with an attorney before signing the waiver;154
(6) the employee must be given at least twenty-one days to decide whether to
sign the waiver;155 and (7) the employee must have the opportunity to revoke
the agreement within seven days of its execution.156 Congress also placed the
burden of proof on the employer to establish the validity of a waiver.157

143. Judith Droz Keyes & Douglas J. Farmer, Settlement of Age Discrimination Claims—The
Meaning and Impact of the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, 12 LAB. LAW. 261, 263
(1996).
144. Id.
145. 787 F.2d 1039, 1045 (6th Cir. 1986) (en banc).
146. Keyes & Farmer, supra note 143, at 264.
147. Legislative Regulation and Administrative Exemption Allowing for Non-EEOC
Supervised Waivers Under the ADEA, 52 Fed. Reg. 32,293 (Aug. 27, 1987) (codified at 29
C.F.R. § 1627).
148. Keyes & Farmer, supra note 143, at 264–67 (discussing congressional response to
Runyan and EEOC regulation authorizing unsupervised waiver).
149. Act of Oct. 16, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-433, §201, 104 Stat. 978, 983–84 (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 626(f) (2006)).
150. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(A).
151. Id. § 626(f)(1)(B).
152. Id. § 626(f)(1)(C).
153. Id. § 626(f)(1)(D).
154. Id. § 626(f)(1)(E).
155. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(F)(i).
156. Id. § 626(f)(1)(G).
157. Id. § 626(f)(3).
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While waivers of ADEA claims do not require the same degree of
oversight as waivers of claims under the FLSA, more is required than of
waivers of Title VII and FMLA claims.
III. WAIVER OF FMLA RIGHTS SHOULD REQUIRE COURT OR AGENCY
APPROVAL
As noted above, courts were split on the issue of whether waivers of
FMLA claims required court or DOL approval to be valid.158 However, when
the DOL amended section 825.220(d) judicial disagreement became irrelevant,
and employers may now secure “release of FMLA claims by employees based
on past employer conduct without the approval of the Department of Labor or
a court.”159
As a result of the DOL’s amendment, waivers of FMLA rights are
essentially afforded the least amount of protection of all of the employment
statutes. FMLA waivers do not require preapproval like the FLSA or the
satisfaction of additional statutory waiver requirements like the ADEA.
Although the rules governing FMLA waivers appear identical to waivers of
Title VII rights, a close examination reveals that in actuality employees who
waive their Title VII claims are afforded more protection than employees who
waive their FMLA claims.
The astonishing ease in which employers can secure waivers of FMLA
rights undercuts the underlying purpose of the FMLA and thus, threatens the
job security the statute was designed to provide. Moreover, the current FMLA
waiver rules ignore the significant differences between the FMLA and
discrimination statutes like Title VII.
A.

Unsupervised Waivers Undercut the Purpose of the FMLA

Like the FLSA, the FMLA was enacted to set minimum labor standards.
While the FLSA’s focus is on minimum labor standards in the area of pay,160
the FMLA’s focus is on minimum labor standards in the area of sick leave and
was enacted to address “inadequate job security for employees who have
serious health conditions that prevent them from working for temporary
periods.”161 Moreover, the FMLA was “based on the same principle as the
child labor laws, the minimum wage, Social Security, the safety and health

158.
159.
160.
161.

See supra Part I.C.
29 C.F.R. 825.220(d) (2010); see supra Part I.D.
29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a)(1), 207(a)(1) (2006).
29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(4) (2006).
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laws, the pension and welfare benefit laws, and other labor laws that establish
minimum standards for employment.”162
As previously discussed, the Supreme Court held that the FLSA statutory
minimum labor standard entitlements, which affected the public interest, could
not be waived or released because “such waiver or release contravenes the
statutory policy.”163 Moreover, the Court has held that statutory entitlements
under the FLSA cannot be abridged by contract or otherwise waived because
this would “nullify the purposes of the statute and thwart the legislative
policies it was designed to effectuate.”164 Because the FLSA and the FMLA
both establish minimum labor standards, the same policy reasons that
supported the employers in Brooklyn not being able to avoid their obligations
and responsibilities under the FLSA support the conclusion that employees’
FMLA rights and entitlements should not be able to be bargained away.

162. H.R. REP. NO. 103-8, pt. 1, at 21–22 (1993). The child labor laws, the minimum wage,
Social Security, the safety and health laws, the pension and welfare benefit laws, and other labor
laws that establish minimum standards for employment all
arose in response to specific problems with broad implications. The minimum wage was
enacted because of the societal interest in preventing the payment of exploitative wages.
Children worked for long hours, under unsafe conditions, before the child labor laws were
enacted. The Social Security Act was based on the belief that workers should be assured
a minimum pension at retirement. The Occupational Safety and Health Act created
standards to help assure safe and healthy workplaces.
....
There is a common set of principles underlying these labor standards. In each
instance, a Federal labor standard directly addressed a serious societal problem, such as
the exploitation of child labor, or the exposure of workers to unsafe working conditions.
Voluntary corrective actions on the part of employers had proven inadequate, with
experience failing to substantiate the claim that, left alone, all employers would act
responsibly. Finally, each law was enacted with the needs of employers in mind. Care
was taken to establish standards that employers could meet.
It is a minority of employers who act irresponsibly. Even without minimum
standards most employers would pay a living wage, take steps to protect the health and
safety of their work force, and offer their employees decent benefits. A central reason that
labor standards are necessary is to relieve the competitive pressure placed on responsible
employers by employers who act irresponsibly. Federal labor standards take broad
societal concerns out of the competitive process so that conscientious employers are not
forced to compete with unscrupulous employers.
The FMLA was drafted with these principles in mind and fits squarely within the
tradition of the labor standards laws that have preceded it. In the past, Congress has
responded to changing economic realities by enacting labor standards that are now widely
accepted. In drawing on this tradition, the FMLA proposes a minimum labor standard to
address significant new developments in today’s workplace.
Id.
163. Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, at 704 (1945).
164. Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740 (1981) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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Allowing the bargaining away of the rights that serve the public interest will
allow employers to avoid the statutory minimum labor standard entitlements
that Congress concluded was in the public interest to codify.
B.

The Significant Differences Between the FMLA and Title VII Compel
Stricter Treatment of FMLA Waivers

Not only does the purpose of the FMLA support stricter FMLA waiver
requirements, but the many significant differences between the FMLA and
Title VII compel stricter treatment of waivers of FMLA claims.
1.

Familiarity with the Law

Generally, when courts are determining the validity of an employee’s
signed release which waives his or her rights under federal employment
statutes, the courts look to see if the waiver of rights was “knowing and
voluntary.”165 It goes without saying that the more an employee understands
the rights afforded under a particular federal employment statute, the greater
the chance that the employee’s unsupervised waiver of those rights will be
“knowing and voluntary.” The corollary then is that the less an employee
understands about a particular federal employment statute, the lower the
chance that an unsupervised waiver of the rights afforded under that statute
will be “knowing and voluntary.” These propositions underscore the problem
with treating waivers of FMLA claims in the same manner as waivers of Title
VII claims.
Title VII was enacted in 1964, and since that time, employees have
become very familiar with the rights provided under Title VII.166 The general
public fully understands that Title VII makes it illegal for an employer to
discriminate in employment practices based on race, color, religion, sex and
national origin. More than 50,000 Title VII charges of discrimination have
been filed each year during the last decade.167 More than 68,000 Title VII
charges of discrimination were filed during the 2009 fiscal year.168 Thousands
of lawsuits have been filed, many of which have involved high profile cases.
Because employees understand and are familiar with Title VII, employees
easily recognize those situations when an employer may be engaging in
165. Craig Robert Senn, Knowing and Voluntary Waivers of Federal Employment Claims:
Replacing the Totality of Circumstances Test with a “Waiver Certainty” Test, 58 FLA. L. REV.
305, 310 (2006) (discussing the “knowing and voluntary” standard for waiver of federal
employment claims).
166. See Robert M. Weems, Selected Issues and Trends in Civil Litigation in Mississippi
Federal District Courts, 77 MISS. L.J. 977, 1021 (2008) (noting that Title VII is the “most
familiar” of all of the federal antidiscrimination statutes).
167. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Charges, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/sta
tistics/enforcement/titlevii.cfm (last visited Oct. 8, 2011).
168. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2011]

A NEXT STEP IN HEALTH CARE REFORM

27

conduct in violation of Title VII. This understanding and familiarity allow
employees the ability to waive their rights without the necessity of oversight or
approval by the courts or the EEOC.
In contrast to Title VII, the FMLA, which has been in force less than
twenty years, is still a mystery to many.169 Most employees are still unfamiliar
with the specific rights afforded under the statute.170 The number of FMLA
claims filed with the DOL each year is but a fraction of the number of Title VII
claims filed with EEOC each year.171 While the differences in the number of
claims filed can be explained in part by the unique protections provided under
the statutes, the differences in numbers also suggest that employees are not as
familiar with their rights under the FMLA as they are with their rights under
Title VII.
Compounding the problem of lack of familiarity is that releases often do
not specifically mention the FMLA, even though most releases do explicitly
identify Title VII claims as claims being released.172 When employees are
unfamiliar with the rights afforded under the FMLA and the release does not
make specific reference to the fact that FMLA claims are being released, the
employees are not provided a fair opportunity to “knowingly and voluntarily”
waive their rights. If supervision of the FMLA waiver was mandated, there
would be assurances that the employees were adequately informed before
relinquishing their FMLA entitlements.
2.

Context in Which Waivers Arise

Another key difference between the FMLA and Title VII is the context in
which waivers of actual claims arise. As discussed above, most employees are
familiar with the prohibitions of Title VII. That being the case, when an
employee is not hired, not promoted, terminated, or subjected to some other
adverse employment action and the employee believes the adverse action was
because of his or her race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, the employee
will often take immediate steps to address his or her concern that the employer

169. See Beverly A. Block, The Reality of FMLA and Parental Leave, LAW. J., Sept. 12,
2008, at 7 (noting that lawyers and non-lawyers alike are unfamiliar with the provisions of the
FMLA).
170. Id.
171. According to the most recent DOL figures, 1889 FMLA complaints were filed with the
DOL in 2008. 2008 Statistics Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 6 (Dec. 2008), http://www.dol.
gov/whd/statistics/2008FiscalYear.pdf. Compare this to the almost 70,000 Title VII charges filed
in 2008. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Charges, supra note 167. 2009 FMLA figures
are not yet available.
172. Even when the release failed to make specific reference to the FMLA, at least one court
found that FMLA claims were waived where the release contained a general catch-all provision.
See Faris v. Williams WPC-I, Inc., 332 F.3d 316, 318, 322 (5th Cir. 2003).
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has violated Title VII.173 Thus, the vast majority of Title VII actions and the
accompanying settlements arise out of individual challenges to employer
conduct as opposed to mass layoff situations.174
While some FMLA challenges to employer actions arise in independent
individual situations as well,175 anecdotal evidence appears to suggest that
many FMLA claims and waiver issues arise in the context of a mass reduction
in force.176 Such was the situation in the Taylor case.
In Taylor, the plaintiff received a poor productivity evaluation when her
employer, in violation of the FMLA, counted her FMLA-qualifying leave
against her.177 The plaintiff was then selected for the reduction in force
because of her evaluation.178 As the Taylor case demonstrates, FMLA issues
may not arise or become evident until a mass layoff or reduction in force
occurs. When large numbers of employees are being terminated and are being
provided with the same standard release, employees with actual FMLA
violation issues may find it difficult to give their FMLA claims the
individualized attention they would receive if the issues arose in an individual
situation.
These types of waiver concerns in mass layoff situations were also present
in ADEA cases. Indeed, Congress enacted the Older Workers Benefit
Protection Act (“OWBPA”) out of concern that individuals would waive their
ADEA rights in a mass layoff scenario without fully appreciating the rights
they were abandoning.179 So too should employees waiving their FMLA rights
be afforded greater waiver protections, especially in mass layoff situations.
And again, the best method to ensure that employees give the waiver of their
FMLA claims adequate attention is to require supervised waivers.
3.

Economic Duress

The economic reality facing employees with FMLA claims also supports
stricter control of FMLA waivers. While any employee who is facing loss of
employment will be confronted with financial hardship, individuals who
utilized or sought to utilize their FMLA rights are often in a more difficult
economic situation than those waiving rights afforded under Title VII and the
other federal employment statutes. This is because employees who have
173. See supra notes 166–167 and accompanying text.
174. See Keyes & Farmer, supra note 143, at 266.
175. See, e.g., Faris v. Williams WPC-I, Inc., 332 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2003).
176. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 60 Fed. Reg. 2180, 2218 (Jan. 6, 1995)
(Employers and employer advocates raised concerns regarding the non-waiverability of the
FMLA as provided in the original section 825.220(d) and impact the rule would have on early
retirement programs.).
177. Taylor I, 415 F.3d 364, 366 (4th Cir. 2005).
178. Keyes & Farmer, supra note 143, at 365–67.
179. Id. at 264–65.
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utilized their rights under the FMLA have, by nature of the rights afforded
under the statute, required leave from their job to address either their own or a
family member’s serious health condition.180 Moreover, serious health issues
often result in significant medical bills. Thus, these employees often find
themselves in a tight financial situation due to health care costs and the
exhaustion of paid sick leave.181 When faced with a release accompanying the
termination of their employment, these employees must decide between
signing a release and receiving a modest severance and limited continuation of
benefits during a time of financial crisis or refusing to sign the release and
receiving no severance or continuation of health benefits following their
termination.
Most employees in such a situation will have no choice but to sign the
severance agreement in order to, at least in the short term, continue to provide
for their families. The superior position of employers over employees facing
economic turmoil due to health-related issues underscores the need for
supervised waivers in FMLA cases, particularly in mass-layoff situations.
4.

Greater Consequences When FMLA Claims Are Waived

When an employee waives a viable claim under the FMLA via a release
when his employment is being terminated, an often underappreciated
consequence results—the employee will not be covered under the FMLA again
until that employee has been employed with a covered employer for at least
one year.182 This is in stark contrast to waivers of claims of any of the other
employment statutes. If an employee waives his rights under Title VII, the
ADEA, or even the FLSA, the employee is afforded the protection of those
statutes immediately upon securing other employment with a covered
employer. The waiving of an FMLA claim in the same context will not only
affect the employee’s ability to prosecute the employer’s FMLA violation, but
it will affect the employee’s ability to be covered under the Act for at least a
year.183 It is not hard to imagine that many employees would fail to fully
appreciate this consequence when faced with termination and a release that
will provide temporary compensation and benefits. And when employees do
not fully appreciate what they are foregoing in releasing their FMLA claims,
they are not able to properly assess whether the consideration offered in

180. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2006). The FMLA also provides for leave following the birth or
adoption of a child. Id. These cases do not generally result in a violation of the FMLA because
employers by in large are accustomed to providing maternity and paternity leave.
181. The FMLA provides for 12 weeks of unpaid leave. Id. § 2612(a)(1), (c). So, unless the
employer provides for paid sick leave, employees who utilize their FMLA leave have job
protection upon their return, id. § 2614(a)(1), but not income during their leave period.
182. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2); 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(a) (2010).
183. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2); 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(a).
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exchange for their release is adequate. In determining the adequacy of the
consideration, the employee should consider the available FMLA leave under
the employee’s current employment, the ability to promptly secure new
employment so the employee could begin accumulating time toward the oneyear employment prerequisite, and the need for FMLA leave in the future.
Because in reduction-in-force scenarios employers usually provide the same
severance amount or use the same severance formula when paying terminated
employees in exchange for the employees’ agreement to release employment
claims, the severance amounts are not adequate consideration when an
employee is waiving a viable FMLA claim, particularly when the employee is
also giving up protection under the statute for no less than a year. In such an
unequal bargaining situation, the need for review of waivers is obvious.
C. Requiring Supervised Waivers of FMLA Claims Will Not Reduce the
Number of FMLA Settlements or Unduly Burden the Process
Many proponents of unsupervised waivers of FMLA claims cite to the
policy favoring settlement of employment claims. Indeed, the courts and
Congress have repeatedly expressed the preference that employment claims be
resolved via voluntary settlement by the parties.184
However, requiring supervised waivers of FMLA claims will not
necessarily reduce the number of voluntary settlements. Requiring supervised
settlements will simply provide employees who are waiving their rights with
relevant information from which they can make a “knowing and voluntary”
decision. It bears noting that despite having the requirement of supervised
settlement, most FLSA claims are resolved by settlement rather than
litigation.185 The supervised waiver requirement under the FLSA is not meant
to decrease the number of voluntary settlements; rather, the supervision is
intended to ensure that employers are not thwarting the purpose of the statute
by securing waivers of employees’ entitlements under the statute.
Furthermore, requiring supervised FMLA waivers will not unduly burden
the DOL or the courts as some have argued. Employers are able to identify
those situations in which significant FMLA liability risks are present. Not
every employee is eligible for FMLA leave.186 Not every eligible employee
requires or seeks FMLA leave. Not every employee who seeks FMLA leave is

184. See Daniel P. O’Gorman, A State of Disarray: The “Knowing and Voluntary” Standard
for Releasing Claims Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L.
73, 110 (2005).
185. Bonetti v. Embarq Mgmt. Co., 715 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1225 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (explaining
that “[m]ost FLSA cases now generally settle early-on in the litigation process”).
186. Employees are eligible if they have worked for a covered employer for at least 12
months and worked 1250 hours during the 12-month period immediately preceding the start of
the leave. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2); 29 C.F.R. § 825.110.
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denied the requested leave. Thus, the employer should not have a difficult
time identifying those situations where a risk of FMLA liability exists.187
Moreover, the potential risk of an FMLA violation by an employer is far
less than the potential risk of an FLSA violation. Indeed, the DOL’s
enforcement numbers bear this out. In fiscal year 2008, the Wage and Hour
Division of the Department of Labor collected more than $185 million in back
wages for 228,645 employees.188 Of those employees, more than 197,000
were employees with minimum wage and overtime back wage violations.189 In
contrast, only 1,082 of the 228,645 employees who received back wages had
FMLA violation cases.190 Based on these enforcement numbers, employers
have a much greater risk of violating the FLSA than violating the FMLA.
Because of the low risk of FMLA liability and the employers’ ability to
identify those situations where risk of liability exists, employers will continue
to handle severance and settlement agreements as they have in the past, i.e.,
seeking DOL or court approval only in those rare instances where significant
FLSA or FMLA liability exists.
Additionally, both the courts and the DOL are equipped to handle requests
for approval when such approval is required because both entities have
processes in place by which to supervise settlements of FMLA claims. With
respect to the DOL, the Secretary supervises FMLA settlements in the same
manner as the Secretary supervises settlements under the FLSA.191 With
respect to the courts, where an FMLA case is pending before the court, there is
nothing in the legislative or regulatory scheme that would prevent the court
from approving settlements in the same manner as it approves FLSA
settlements.
If waivers of FMLA rights required approval, two things would occur.
First, employers would take steps to ensure that employees’ rights have not
been violated, and second, employees would be fully informed of the effects of

187. In its supplemental brief filed during the Fourth Circuit review of Taylor v. Progress
Energy, Inc., the employer acknowledged that
[w]hen employers and employees enter into severance or settlement agreements, they
rarely seek DOL approval of the release of FLSA claims because the risk exposure from
unreleased minimum wage and overtime compensation claims is limited and employers
can identify those situations in which significant liability risks are present and limit their
approval requests to such situations.
Supplemental Brief of Appellee at 11, Taylor II, 493 F.3d 454 (4th Cir. 2007) (No. 04-1525),
2006 WL 2432028.
188. 2008 Statistics Fact Sheet, supra note 171, at 1.
189. Id. at 2.
190. Id. at 7.
191. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(b)(1) (directing the DOL to resolve FMLA complaints in the same
manner it resolves complaints under the FLSA—in accordance with 29 U.S.C. § 216).
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waiving their rights before waiving them. The end result would be a statute
that ensures basic job security when it comes to employees’ health care issues.
IV. CHANGING AND CHALLENGING THE FMLA NON-SUPERVISION OF WAIVER
RULE
Although, as discussed above, there are very strong arguments supporting
the requirement that FMLA waivers be supervised, such is not the case under
the current law.192 Employees and advocates who want to ensure that
employees who waive their FMLA rights do so only after being fully and
adequately informed through supervised waivers may advocate for executive,
legislative, and judicial actions to modify the existing law.
A.

Executive and Legislative Options

During the last months of the prior president’s administration, a number of
regulatory amendments were proposed. When regulation changes take place
during a change in the administration, the new executive often takes steps to
halt the amendment process. Indeed, President Obama, in one of his first acts
as President, ordered federal agencies to “[w]ithdraw from the [Office of the
Federal Register] all proposed or final regulations that have not been
published” to allow his administration to review them.193 However, the rule
amending section 825.220(d) was not affected by this order because the final
rule amending section 825.220(d) was issued on November 17, 2008 and
became effective January 16, 2009, prior to President Obama taking the oath of
office on January 20, 2009.194
The only other option for the Executive is to initiate through the DOL a
new administrative rulemaking to nullify the previous administration’s
amendment to section 825.220(d).195 With the economic crisis, high
unemployment, and the health care crisis, it is no surprise that the
Administration and the DOL have not had the amendment of section
825.220(d) as a top priority, especially where the new rulemaking process can
be time-consuming and costly.196 It appears unlikely that such a rulemaking
will occur anytime soon.
192. See supra Part I.D.
193. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg.
4435, 4435 (Jan. 26, 2009). White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel issued the memorandum
on Tuesday, January 20, 2009. Id.
194. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 73 Fed. Reg. 67,934 (Nov. 17, 2008).
195. See Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel Before
a New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557, 592 (2003).
196. See id. (“[A] new administration wishing to change the policy may face significant costs.
Just as the outgoing administration initially did in issuing the rule, the new administration usually
must expend resources on a second full-scale APA notice-and-comment rulemaking, which has
evolved into a relatively expensive and time-consuming process. The now-familiar requirements
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As far as congressional action, Congress had the option of utilizing its
powers under the Congressional Review Act (“CRA”)197 to review the
amendment to section 825.220(d) when the regulation was first amended. The
CRA, in essence, provides Congress with legislative “veto” authority over
agency rules and might have provided Congress with a means to nullify the
amendment in an expedited manner.198 However, this Act has not proven to be
very effective in nullifying agency rules,199 and Congress was apparently
disinclined to utilize the CRA in this situation.
Another option is for Congress to pass new legislation. Indeed, on April
29, 2009, Congresswomen Carol Shea-Porter (D-NH), along with twenty-four
cosponsors, introduced bill H.R. 2161, entitled: To Nullify Certain Regulations
Promulgated Under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 and Restore
Prior Regulations and to Direct the Secretary of Labor to Revise Certain
Additional Regulations Under that Act.200 Representative Shea-Porter
explained that the purpose of H.R. 2161 was to ”restore the Family and
Medical Leave Act to its original intent and spirit.”201 Included in the
proposed revisions is the restoration of section 825.220(d) to its original form,
which prohibits both the prospective and retrospective waiver of FMLA
rights.202
H.R. 2161 was referred to three committees on April 29, 2009—the House
Education and Labor Committee, the House Oversight and Government
Reform Committee, and the House Administration Committee.203 As of this
writing, none of these committees have reported back to the general body of
the House of Representatives. Even though Democrats have at times made up
the majorities in these committees, it is not surprising that this bill has not
made it out of committee, as the House has been preoccupied addressing more
pressing issues, such as the war, healthcare reform, and a failing economy.
The unfortunate and sobering reality is that it is not likely that this bill will be
include the publication of a detailed proposal, often with extensive supporting analyses, and, after
public comments have been received, written responses to all significant comments.” (footnotes
omitted)).
197. Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–08 (2006).
198. Donald S. Dobkin, The Rise of the Administrative State: A Prescription for Lawlessness,
17 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 362, 371–72 (2008).
199. Id. at 372 (noting, that “[i]n the decade following the enactment of the CRA, ‘[a]lmost
42,000 rules were reported to Congress over that period, including 610 major rules, and only one,
the Labor Department’s ergonomics standard, was disapproved in March 2001.’” (quoting 10th
Anniversary of the Congressional Review Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial &
Admin. Law, 109th Cong. 22 (2006))).
200. Family and Medical Leave Restoration Act, H.R. 2161, 111th Cong. (2009).
201. Legal Alert: Legislation to Revise FMLA Introduced, FORD & HARRISON, LLP (May 11,
2009), http://www.fordharrison.com/getpdf.aspx?Type=News&ID=4780.
202. See H.R. 2161, §2(a)(1).
203. 155 CONG. REC. H4998 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 2009).
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signed into law, as the vast majority of bills do not make it out of committee,
and failure to act by a committee effectively “kills” the bill.
B.

Litigation Options

Where the executive and legislative options may not be viable, court
challenges to the regulation and actual waivers may result in meaningful
change.
1.

Direct Challenges to the Regulation

One of the most direct ways for employee advocates to change the current
law is to challenge the legality of the DOL’s amendment. Advocates would
essentially argue that the regulation is invalid because it is contrary to
Congress’ intent.
When enacting the FMLA, Congress saw fit to not only create statutory
entitlements related to sick leave, but, as a review of the statutory language and
legislative history suggests, Congress also intended FMLA rights to be
afforded the same treatment as FLSA rights. As previously discussed, the
waiver restriction on FLSA claims was a judicially-created restriction.204
Congress, seeing the wisdom in the Court’s 1945 ruling, explicitly added
language codifying the FLSA supervision requirement in 1949. In section
216(c) of the FLSA, Congress authorized the DOL
to supervise the payment of the unpaid minimum wages or the unpaid overtime
compensation owing to any employee or employees . . . and the agreement of
any employee to accept such payment shall upon payment in full constitute a
waiver by such employee of any right he may have under subsection (b) of this
section to such unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation and
205
an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.

When it enacted the FMLA, Congress specifically directed the DOL to
resolve the FMLA complaints in the same manner it resolves complaints under
the FLSA.206 Additionally, both statutes provide for collective actions207 and
the remedies provided under the FMLA are analogous to the remedies
provided under the FLSA.208 Congress’ reliance on the well-established FLSA
204. See supra notes 120–124 and accompanying text.
205. 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (2006).
206. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(b)(1); see also S. REP. NO. 103-3, at 35 (1993) (“[The FMLA’s]
enforcement scheme is modeled on the enforcement scheme of the FLSA.”), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 37.
207. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2).
208. See S. REP. NO. 103-3, at 35 (1993) (“The relief provided in FMLA also parallels the
provisions of the FLSA.”), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 37; see also Jordan v. U.S. Postal
Serv., 379 F.3d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir. 2004) (looking to the FLSA “for guidance in interpreting
FMLA damages because of the similarity of the damages provisions”); Arban v. West Publ’g
Corp., 345 F.3d 390, 407 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[T]his court previously has turned to the Fair Labor
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enforcement and remedial provisions strongly supports the conclusion that it
was Congress’ intent that FMLA claims be treated as FLSA claims, including
the requirement that waivers be supervised to be valid.
Indeed, the DOL appeared to recognize Congress’ intent when it initially
promulgated section 825.220(d). As previously noted, the DOL explicitly
rejected the employers’ recommendation that the language of the regulation be
modified to allow waivers and releases of FMLA claims in the same manner as
Title VII and ADEA claims.209 The DOL stated that it had “concluded that
prohibitions against employees waiving their rights and employers inducing
employees to waive their rights constitute sound public policy under the
FMLA, as is also the case under other labor standards statutes such as the
FLSA.”210
Because the DOL amendment is contrary to congressional intent,
advocates should challenge the validity of the amendment in the courts.
2.

Challenges of the Waivers

Another, and possibly the most viable, option is for employees to challenge
the waiver of FMLA rights in their individual situations. As discussed above,
jurisdictions require that employees “knowingly and voluntarily” waive their
rights under federal employment statute before the waiver will be enforced
against them.211 Also discussed was employees’ lack of familiarity with the
FMLA, particularly when compared to employees’ knowledge of other
employment statutes.212 Because of the continuing confusion surrounding the
rights and responsibility under the FMLA, employees should challenge
waivers on the ground that the waivers were not voluntarily and knowingly
made in cases where employers secured waivers utilizing releases that did not
explicitly state that the employees were waiving their rights under the FMLA.
Employees should also challenge waivers when an employer, who knows,
or has reason to know, that the employee is entitled to FMLA relief, fails to so
advise the employee before securing a waiver of the employee’s FMLA rights.
The FMLA imposes an affirmative duty on employers to advise employees that
they may be entitled to FMLA leave when the employer receives information

Standards Act (FLSA), which contains similar remedial provisions, for guidance in interpreting
the FMLA.”); Smith v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 298 F.3d 955, 968–69 (10th Cir.
2002) (interpreting FMLA cost provisions in the same way they are interpreted under the FLSA);
Frizzell v. Sw. Motor Freight, 154 F.3d 641, 644 (6th Cir. 1998) (“Because the FMLA’s link to
the remedial provisions of the FLSA is stronger than it is to Title VII . . . we rely on case law
under the FLSA rather than Title VII . . . .”).
209. See supra notes 38–42 and accompanying text.
210. Supra note 40.
211. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
212. See supra Part III.B.1.
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that would indicate that the employee may be entitled to FMLA leave.213
Section 825.303 provides that “the employee need not expressly assert rights
under the FMLA or even mention the FMLA” and that “[t]he employer will be
expected to obtain any additional required information through informal
means” to determine if the leave request falls under the FMLA.214
Thus, employers have an affirmative duty under the FMLA to inform
employees that they are or may be eligible for FMLA protection even if
employees are not aware of their entitlement. This affirmative duty on the
employer to determine if an employee is entitled to FMLA leave recognizes
that employers are often in a better position than employees to determine
whether leave requested is FMLA-qualifying leave.
The employer’s
affirmative duty set forth in sections 825.300 and 825.303 also underscores the
principle that the employer should not benefit from an employee’s lack of
understanding or knowledge of the rights afforded under the FMLA.
This affirmative duty should likewise apply when an employer seeks to
have an employee waive his or her FMLA rights. An employer should not be
allowed to secure a waiver of FMLA rights when the employer is aware or
should be aware that the employee may be waiving a viable FMLA claim
without first clearly and explicitly advising the employee of her possible
entitlement to FMLA rights. Allowing an employer to secure a waiver of
FMLA rights when the employer has information which indicates that the
employee is entitled to utilize rights under the FMLA but fails to so inform the
employee, not only allows the employer to thwart the purpose of the statute,
but also fails to produce a waiver that was knowingly and voluntarily given.215
Thus, employees should challenge waivers when the employer had sufficient
information to know that the employee was entitled to FMLA coverage, but
failed to so inform the employee before securing a waiver of the employee’s
rights under the FMLA.
CONCLUSION
Throughout history, all three branches of government have recognized the
importance of the right of individuals to be gainfully employed to support their
family. Our government has also recognized that individuals are entitled to
213. 29 C.F.R. § 825.300 (2010).
214. Id. § 825.303(b) (providing the contents of an employee notice for unforeseeable FMLA
leave); see also id. § 825.302(c) (providing the contents of an employee notice for foreseeable
FMLA leave).
215. Requiring employers to come forward with information related to a possible employment
claim prior to securing a waiver of employment rights is not unprecedented. Employers are
obligated under the ADEA to provide employees with demographic information related to age
before an employer may secure the employees’ wavier of ADEA rights in mass layoff situation.
29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(H) (2006).
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fair treatment in the conditions of employment. Such fair treatment includes,
inter alia, the right to a safe working environment, the right not to lose one’s
job because of gender, race, or age, and the right to fair compensation. The
principles of fairness also dictate that an employee who has worked for one
year or more for an employer should not lose her job simply because a serious
health condition causes that employee to miss work for a short period of time.
Congress affirmed the fairness and rightness of job security in the face of
health issues when it enacted the FMLA. Principles of fairness then also
require that employers not be allowed to secure a waiver of FMLA rights from
an employee without that employee having given the waiver of her FMLA
rights thoughtful and deliberate consideration. And, the only way to ensure a
knowing and voluntary waiver of FMLA rights is to require approval of
waivers of FMLA claims by the courts or the DOL. Indeed, this is what
Congress intended when it enacted the FMLA and what the DOL intended
when it promulgated the FMLA waiver regulation. Now with the country
being confronted with massive job losses and inadequate health care, hopefully
the President, Congress, and the judiciary will take steps to ensure that the
rights afforded employees under the FMLA are not stripped away with the use
of unsupervised waivers.
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